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To Mediate or Adjudicate? An
Alternative for Resolving Whistleblower Disputes
at the Hanford Nuclear Site
Angela Day*
I. INTRODUCTION
On a sunny morning in 1997, seven pipefitters working at the Hanford
Nuclear Site (Hanford) refused to install a valve in a pipe that would be
used to transfer high-level nuclear waste from tank to tank.1 The workers
expressed concerns that the valve was potentially unsafe, asserting that it
was not rated to handle the pressure test outlined in the job specifications.2
After they refused to install the valve, they were sent home and laid off.3
The pipefitters filed a complaint with the US Department of Labor
(DOL), the agency tasked with adjudicating claims related to whistleblower
protections.4 The workers claimed retaliatory discharge under the federal
Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) of 1974.5 The ERA, as amended, applies
to workers employed at commercial and defense sites, including contractors
hired by the US Department of Energy (DOE). The pipefitters were
employed by DOE contractor Fluor Federal Services. After a DOL
investigator ruled in favor of the workers, Fluor agreed to reinstate them.6
*

Angela Day is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Washington. This article is part of a larger study supported by a grant from
the Harry S. Bridges Center for Labor Studies at the University of Washington.
1
Annette Cary, Court Upholds Hanford Pipefitter $4.8M Jury Award, TRI-CITY
HERALD, Sept. 5, 2008, http://www.tri-cityherald.com/2008/09/05/305618/courtupholds-hanford-pipefitter.html.
2
Brundridge v. Fluor Fed. Servs., Inc., 191 P.3d 879, 884 (2008).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
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But in 1998, Fluor again laid off the seven workers, as well as four
additional workers who claimed they were targeted for supporting the
original group.7
The eleven workers filed claims with the DOL alleging retaliatory
discharge for the 1998 dismissals, but ultimately withdrew them to pursue
their claims in court.8 In 1999, the eleven workers filed a lawsuit in Benton
County Superior Court, alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy.9 In 2008—eleven years after the original incident—the Washington
Supreme Court upheld a 2005 jury award of $4.8 million in damages for the
workers and $1.4 million in attorney fees.10 Plaintiffs’ attorney Jack
Sheridan stated, “[the pipefitters] stood up for safety when everyone else
put their heads down for fear of being fired. It took a while, but this
decision proves that the system works.”11
While the eleven pipefitters were vindicated in court, their struggle lasted
over a decade and, if the experiences of other high profile whistleblowers
are any indication, it surely took a toll on their professional, personal, and
financial lives.12 The lengthy proceedings focused on the legal question of
whether these workers were wrongfully discharged, rather than on the
policies or practices that gave rise to the original safety concern.13 For
7

Id.
Id.
9
Id.
10
Cary, supra note 1.
11
Id.
12
See, e.g., C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS: BROKEN LIVES AND
ORGANIZATIONAL POWER 1–2 (2001) (summarizing the experiences of whistleblowers
interviewed in the book); id. at 125–27 (drawing conclusions about why whistleblowers
ultimately sacrifice personal and professional relationships); MYRON PERETZ GLAZER &
PENINA MIGDAL GLAZER, WHISTLEBLOWERS: EXPOSING CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT
AND INDUSTRY 3–8 (summarizing the risks that whistleblowers face); id. at 239–40
(describing the forces that make “dissent increasingly dangerous”).
13
The DOL is mandated to investigate and make a determination about whether an
employee was wrongfully discharged for engaging in a “protected activity,” such as
raising a safety concern, and whether the employee faced “adverse action” as a result of
8
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workers remaining on the job, this incident and subsequent proceedings can
create a “chilling effect,” which has been defined as “the unwillingness or
reluctance of workers to engage in protected activity (i.e., to raise concerns)
because of a fear of retaliation or reprisal.”14 In short, retaliation against the
pipefitters for raising a concern seems likely to discourage workers from
speaking out about health, safety, or environmental concerns that could
result in an accident.
The pipefitters’ case could have been resolved through an alternative to
the traditional system that federal whistleblower statutes or state laws
outline. At Hanford, private contractors and members of public interest
groups agreed to establish—with the support of the DOE and elected
officials—a council for resolving concerns that operates outside of
administrative claims and court proceedings (the Hanford Council, or
Council).15 This alternative approach is different from other forms of
mediation or arbitration that are generally available to parties at any point in
their protected activity. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATIONS
MANUAL 2–7 (2011), available at http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive_pdf/CPL_0203-003.pdf. Investigations are carried out by the DOL’s Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA). Id. at 1–16. The Washington Supreme Court focused on the
issue of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Brundridge, 191 P.3d at 885.
The court summarized the legal question as follows: “(1) that a clear public policy exists
(the ‘clarity’ element), (2) that discouraging the conduct in which the employee engaged
would jeopardize the public policy (the ‘jeopardy’ element), and (3) that the employee's
public-policy-related conduct caused the dismissal (the ‘causation’ element).” Id.
14
BILLIE PIRNER GARDE, REPORT TO THE U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, AUTHORITY,
RESPONSIBILITY, AND JURISDICTION OF THE DOE, EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM TO
ENSURE EMPLOYEES MAY RAISE CONCERNS WITHOUT FEAR OF REPRISAL 6 n.12 (2000)
(on file with author). See also U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, NRC
ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 26 (Aug. 1998), available at http://www.orau.org/ptp/
PTP%20Library/library/NRC/NUREG/0195/Ch1-8.pdf (describing a chilling effect as
discrimination “broadly defined and should include intimidation or harassment that could
lead a person to reasonably expect that, if he or she makes allegations about what he or
she believes are unsafe conditions, the compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment could be affected”).
15
See History, HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/
doc/council_history.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).
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the litigation process or that are mandated by labor agreements.16 The
Hanford Council is granted authority to resolve worker concerns through a
charter, which serves as a touchstone for the resolution process.17 Workers
are not required to engage in litigation, secure legal counsel, file formal
claims, or incur any expense.18 The resolution process focuses on the
circumstances that gave rise to a worker’s concern rather than on procedural
requirements or legal questions.19 Although the pipefitters’ employer, Fluor
Federal Services, was a signatory to the Council’s charter in 1997,20 and the
dispute could have been resolved through this mechanism, the case
proceeded through the traditional system of administrative adjudication and
court proceedings. Comparing this case to those resolved through the
Hanford Council, this article proposes that the alternative model does more
to further the policy goal of protecting workers who raise concerns than
does the traditional model outlined in whistleblower statutes such as the
16

See, e.g., JOHN T. DUNLOP & ARNOLD M. ZACK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 53 (1997). “Society now has a growing interst in arbitration a
the faster, more economical, and preferred means of resolving employment disputs,
particularly as they concern rights protected by state and federal statutes.” Id. See also id.
at 75 (describing the proliferation of employer mandated arbitration agreements); id. at
90 (regarding enforceability).
17
See Hanford Concerns Council Charter, HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL,
http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/doc/council_charter.htm (last visited Oct. 9,
2012).
18
Bringing Concerns to the Council: Questions and Answers, HANFORD CONCERNS
COUNCIL, http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/doc/bring_qna.htm (last visited Nov.
24, 2012).
19
HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, PROGRESS REPORT 2010 4 (2010), available at
http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/report_progressreport2010.pdf
[hereinafter PROGRESS REPORT 2010].
Unlike adversarial forums for resolving disputes, the Council focuses on
preserving an employee’s career progress and resolving the underlying issues
that gave rise to the dispute. Instead of seeking to assign blame, the process
focuses on addressing the underlying safety, health, or environmental concerns
and fostering shared goals for a safety-conscious workplace.
Id.
20

See HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, supra note 15.
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ERA or the litigation options granted in some federal and state statutes.21
Implicit in the policy goal of whistleblower protection is a desire to
prevent catastrophic accidents that could harm workers, the environment,
and members of the public. This article argues that the promise of achieving
safe operations by granting formal legal rights to raise concerns in the
workplace is best fulfilled through an alternative approach to administrative
claims and litigation. Finally, this article suggests that the conditions which
gave rise to this alternative model at Hanford are not unique to this site or
statute and that lessons learned from the Hanford Council alternative
method offer principles to guide similar alternative mechanisms towards
similar ends.
To reach these conclusions, Part II of this article reviews the
circumstances that gave rise to the formation of the Hanford Council. It
identifies the interests of elected officials, agency leaders, private
contractors, and public-interest advocates that led these groups to agreement
on this alternative model, and proposes a general framework for identifying
when interests might align and lead to agreement on an alternative
approach. As part of this analysis, Part II provides a theoretical discussion
about the intended goals of traditional dispute resolution models, and makes
the case that alternative dispute resolution models may be more effective in
achieving underlying policy goals in some circumstances.
Part III of the article reviews outcomes achieved by the Hanford Council
and suggests theoretical underpinnings that, if followed, may give rise to
similar outcomes in different situations. Part IV reviews lessons learned
from the Hanford Council. It suggests principles necessary to underpin and
21

Eighteen states have enacted public policy exceptions to at-will employment,
recognizing that raising concerns is anathema to the public interest. See generally
THOMAS DEVINE & TAREK MAASSARANI, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, RUNNING
THE GAUNTLET: THE CAMPAIGN FOR CREDIBLE CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWER RIGHTS
(2008),
available
at
http://www.whistleblower.org/storage/documents/
RunningTheGauntletpdf.pdf.
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sustain alternative models in disputes ranging from hazardous waste
cleanup and energy production to natural resource and land use disputes.

II. CHOOSING A MECHANISM FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Conditions that Prompted a Shift to an Alternative Dispute Resolution
Mechanism at the Hanford Site
The Hanford Nuclear Site, located in the desert of southeastern
Washington State, produced plutonium during World War II and the Cold
War.22 Throughout the years of plutonium production, over 25 million cubic
feet of solid waste was dumped at the site, and an estimated 400 million
gallons of liquid waste was dumped into the soil and groundwater.23
Currently, 56 million gallons of high-level nuclear waste are stored in 177
underground tanks, awaiting treatment and long-term storage.24 The DOE is
tasked with cleaning up the 586 square-mile site—a challenge that is
estimated to cost billions over the next several decades.25
As the Cold War came to a close and site operations began to focus on
cleanup in the early 1990s, a number of whistleblower concerns made their
way to the courts and into the local and national press.26 Reflecting on this
time period, Council Chair Jonathan Brock stated, “lengthy lawsuits,
negative newspaper coverage, congressional or state legislative hearings
22
See Hanford History, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/
programs/nwp/hanford.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2012).
23
ROY E. GEPHART, A SHORT HISTORY OF HANFORD WASTE GENERATION, STORAGE,
AND RELEASE 8–9 (4th rev..2003), available at http://www.pnl.gov/main/publications/
external/technical_reports/PNNL-13605rev4.pdf.
24
Tank Farms, HANFORD, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.hanford.gov/page.cfm/
TankFarms (last visited Dec. 13, 2012).
25
Peter Eisler, Problems Plague Cleanup at Hanford Nuclear Waste Site, USA TODAY,
Jan. 18, 2012, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/environment/story/2012-0125/hanford-nuclear-plutonium-cleanup/52622796/1.
26
See, e.g., GLAZER & GLAZER, supra note 12, at 171–77 (providing an account of
whistleblower Casey Ruud, whose story was covered by the Seattle Times and national
media, and received attention from members of Congress).
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and other embarrassing exposure followed.”27 The coverage and exposure,
in turn, seemed to undermine confidence in the government and contractor
organizations responsible for site safety or environmental cleanup, and to do
so at a substantial cost.28
In 1992, the Washington State Department of Ecology invited the
University of Washington to conduct a study outlining the feasibility of
establishing a forum for alternative dispute resolution.29 After consulting
with the DOE and its contractors, nuclear safety advocates, and elected
officials, the University of Washington study recommended a mechanism
for resolving individual whistleblower cases, but noted that “a case review
mechanism would only be successful if it had legitimacy in the eyes of the
broad range of interested parties.”30
In 1994, with the agreement of all relevant stakeholders, the DOE
sponsored the chartering of the Hanford Council—formally known as the
Hanford Joint Council for Resolving Employee Concerns.31 The Council
was comprised of representatives of DOE contractors, nuclear safety

27
Jonathan Brock, Full and Fair Resolution of Whistleblower Issues: The Hanford Joint
Council for Resolving Employee Concerns, a Pilot ADR Approach, 51 ADMIN. L. REV.
497, 501 (1999) (providing a detailed account of news coverage and public and political
attention to Hanford).
28
See MICHAEL D’ANTONIO, ATOMIC HARVEST: HANFORD AND THE LETHAL TOLL OF
AMERICA’S NUCLEAR ARSENAL (1993) (detailing an account of news coverage, and
public and political attention paid to Hanford and DE Weapons Complex). See also
Brock, supra note 27, at 501.
29
Betty Jane Narver et al., INST. PUB. POL’Y AND MGMT., UNIV. WASH., External
Third-Party Review of Significant Employee Concerns: The Joint Cooperative Council
for Hanford Disputes (Univ. of Wash. Graduate School of Pub. Affairs, Working Paper
No. 93-9, June 1992), available at http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/
council_resources_uwpapers.pdf.
30
Brock, supra note 27, at 507.
31
See HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, supra note 15 (describing a history of the
evolution of the council). As described later in the article, the Hanford Joint Council
briefly ceased operations and reorganized in 2005 as the Hanford Concerns Council. Id.
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advocates, a former whistleblower, and neutral members.32 Acceptance of
all cases and recommended resolutions would be by consensus only, and, as
agreed to in the charter, all recommendations of the Council were
“presumptively implemented” by the contractor.33 In other words, the
parties signed an ex-ante agreement to implement all consensus resolutions.
What prompted these parties to agree to an alternative approach to
resolving disputes? The following discussion analyzes how each group’s
interests led to agreement on an alternative forum, and proposes a
generalizable framework for identifying when interests may align to form
an alternate mechanism for dispute resolution in other circumstances.
1. Elected Officials and Agency Leaders
Both elected officials and agency leaders had an interest in finding a
more efficient way to deal with whistleblower complaints. Elected officials
were spending time in hearings and answering questions from the press as a
result of whistleblower cases in the courts.34 Stakeholders, such as Hanford
workers and nuclear safety advocates, came to elected officials and agency
leaders to voice their disagreement about worker protection practices at the
site. Elected officials from the state of Washington wanted the site cleaned
up, safely and without diverting resources to litigation. In the same vein,
DOE agency leaders received scrutiny in congressional hearings and in the
local and national press.35 Given these drawbacks, elected officials from
Washington State and agency leaders at the DOE were willing to shift from
the traditional system of courts and administrative claims outlined in

32
A Membership that Ensures Neutrality, HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL,
http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/doc/work_neutrality.htm (last visited Nov. 14,
2012).
33
Hanford Concerns Council Charter, supra note 17.
34
Brock, supra note 27, at 507.
35
Id. at 506, 526.
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whistleblower statutes to a consensual process.36
2. Private Contractors
Contractors hired by the DOE had an interest in developing a system that
would resolve concerns with less publicity and expense than the traditional
system. Contractors were spending funds on legal fees and management
time on responding to subpoenas, congressional hearings, and media
requests. Confidence in the contractors’ ability to safely conduct the
cleanup of the site waned—a potentially costly result when cleanup
contracts next came up for bid. In short, these conditions made contractors
willing to shift away from a system of administrative claims and court
proceedings to an alternative approach.
3. Public Interest Advocates
Public interest advocates supported a system that would increase worker
safety while maintaining focus on cleanup operations. Advocates spent
significant amounts of time and resources bringing congressional and media
attention to these important issues and initiating court proceedings. Yet,
although they were often successful in court, they did not believe that
individual cases brought about changes in worker protection policies and
practices, or they thought the changes were too incremental and slow to
protect workers commencing cleanup of the site. Therefore, advocates were
also willing to engage in an alternative mechanism that could reduce their
costs and potentially further their goals more quickly and efficiently.
In short, each of these groups had an interest in the safe and efficient
cleanup of the site and in worker protection. Because all of these groups
were dissatisfied with the traditional system, they were willing to try an
alternative. This may not be the case in every situation where there are
36
See HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, supra note 15 (providing statements from
Washington State elected officials).
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repeat interactions among stakeholders around a common issue or at a
single site. But the following table suggests a framework for recognizing
when interests may align and allow for the development of an alternative
approach.
Table 1. Summary of Conditions under which Parties May Select
Adjudication or Mediation
Conditions under which Parties
May Prefer a Traditional Model of
Dispute Resolution

Conditions under which Parties
May Prefer an Alternative
Mechanism for Dispute Resolution

Legislators/Agency Leaders: in
situations in which relying on the
courts or administrative review
helps to achieve broader goals or
where public and media attention is
desired, elected officials and agency
leaders may prefer adjudication by a
third party

Legislators/Agency
Leaders:
when traditional means of resolving
disputes create unwanted political
attention that detracts from broader
goals, elected officials and agency
leaders may prefer an alternative
approach that focuses on mutual
goals

Business Interests: in instances
where formalized filing and
standing procedures and precedentbased decisions are desired,
disputants are likely to prefer formal
adjudicatory resolution mechanisms

Business
Interests:
when
administrative review and litigation
heighten the costs of dispute
resolution—both in terms of time,
legal costs, or even negative
publicity—disputants may prefer an
alternative approach which can
reduce those costs

Public Interest Advocates: in
instances where heightened media
and political attention to an issue
seems likely to help accomplish

Public Interest Advocates: if there
is (or has been) legislative resistance
to change, and if prior litigation
efforts have been unsuccessful in
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larger goals for changes in policies
or
practices,
public
interest
advocates are likely to prefer
traditional means of dispute
resolution

changing underlying policies and
practices, public interest advocates
may prefer an alternative approach

B. Theoretical Underpinnings of Traditional and Alternative Methods of
Dispute Resolution
This section analyzes why the traditional model of administrative
adjudication and court proceedings is often the default mechanism for
resolving claims or ensuring that policies are implemented as intended. It
suggests how and why important decisions are often delegated to a judge or
other adjudicative body to resolve disputes, and the potential impact of that
delegation on important policy issues. Second, this section suggests why
important problems may be left unresolved and why policy goals may
remain unfulfilled when dispute resolution authority is delegated to a third
party. Finally, it suggests why an alternative to the traditional system of
third party adjudication may be more effective for achieving policy goals.
1. Delegating Dispute Resolution Authority
Delegating authority to a third party to resolve a dispute when two parties
cannot come to an agreement is an age-old practice. Some scholars argue
that delegation of dispute resolution authority is becoming increasingly
common due to the emergence of international tribunals, constitutional
review courts, and civil litigation where a judicial authority resolves
disputes that affect important economic and social policies.37 The reasons
for delegating dispute resolution authority to a third party are many and
37

See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political
Courts, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 95, 102 (2008); TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 1–11 (2003).
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varied, but include legislators’ desire to delegate politically contentious
issues to a neutral third party,38 private corporations’ desire for predictable
processes and precedent-based outcomes,39 and advocates’ attempts to
change accepted norms or values that underlie civil or other rights.40 Yet,
despite these perceived advantages, there are disadvantages to delegating
authority to a neutral third party—namely, subjecting the dispute to the
standards and values of an outsider and losing control over publicity and
outcomes.41
Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet have described the resolution of
disputes between two parties as a circular process.42 In their conception, the
circle begins when two disputing parties cannot come to agreement without
delegating some authority to a third party to help resolve their differences.
In this case, “delegation is likely when, for each disputant, going to a third
party is less costly, or more likely to yield a desired outcome, than either
breaking the dyadic contract and going it alone, or attempting to impose a
particular settlement against the wishes of the other disputant.”43 In other
words, a “dyadic” dispute between two parties leads to “triadic” dispute
resolution when a third party is introduced.
In the second phase of this process, the neutral third party makes a

38

See, e.g., Mark Graber, The Non-Majoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the
Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 61–70 (1993); GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE
DEFERRALS: STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
xx–xxvi (2003).
39
See, e.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND
JUDICIALIZATION 72–78 (2002). The authors' suggest shifting preferences among WTO
members away from mediation to formal, written rulings that estalish precedent. Id.
40
See, e.g., CHARLES EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 2–3 (1998); RACHEL A. CICHOWSKI,
THE EUROPEAN COURT AND CIVIL SOCIETY: LITIGATION, MOBILIZATION AND
GOVERNANCE 6 (2007).
41
SHAPIRO & STONE SWEET, supra note 39, at 69.
42
Id. at 60–65.
43
Id. at 61.
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decision that is “concrete, particular, and retrospective.”44 In formal dispute
resolution processes, this decision leads to a new “rule” to settle the specific
conflict between the parties.45 Stated differently, this decision sets precedent
for future resolutions and mandates compliance through compulsory rulings
and resolutions determined by a third party. Thus, this final step in the
circular process of individual dispute resolution leads, gradually and
incrementally, toward broader changes in governance.46
The legal scholars who proposed the conception of a circular process,
Shapiro and Stone Sweet, posit that “as the scope and intensity of these
interactions increase, so will demand for the adaptation of norms, values,
and rules by way of formal dispute resolution. If and when dyadic dispute
resolution fails to satisfy this demand, there will be pressure to use TDR
[triadic dispute resolution] if a triadic mechanism exists, or to invent such a
mechanism if it does not exist.”47
This hypothetical discussion suggests that disputing parties will turn to a
third party to resolve disputes, and, if no default mechanism exists, they will
invent one. The following discussion considers how dispute resolution
mechanisms are established and when parties are likely to turn to them. It
suggests that delegation of dispute resolution authority comes both from the
“top down” through legislation and from the “bottom up” (i.e., from
members of civil society who seek to have an effect on policy through the
courts).

44

Id. at 64.
Id.
46
Id. at 59. Shapiro and Stone Sweet consider governance to be constructed through
“strategic behavior: how individual actors conceive and pursue their interest within any
given community; policy-making: how values and resources are distributed within any
given community; and systemic change: how the normative structure in place in any
given community is constructed, maintained and revised.” Id.
47
Id. at 72.
45
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2. Legislative Delegation
Legislators may delegate decision-making authority to the courts in cases
where the issues are politically charged or in instances where government is
fractured along party lines.48 For example, legislators may want to take
credit for enacting legislation in response to public pressure on issues such
as antitrust or workplace rights, but might lack a coalition to enact specific
rules or remedies.49 In these instances, legislators may delegate authority to
resolve disputes in the courts through grants of standing in legislation.
Grants of standing allow affected parties to challenge the interpretation or
implementation of policies by bureaucratic agencies in court. Under these
conditions, legislation establishes a system of third party adjudication that
assigns dispute resolution authority to administrative agencies or grants
standing to pursue claims in court. In this way, legislators delegate authority
to the courts to develop specific rules that set precedent for the resolution of
disputes about the intent and implementation of laws.
This delegation of authority provides attractive political cover for elected
policymakers, creating a buffer between elected officials and a divided
constituency. Although delegation results in legislators’ loss of power over
decision making, it is not unusual for this tradeoff to be judged a desirable
one. As Ran Hirschl notes, there is a “growing reliance on adjudicative
means for clarifying and settling fundamental moral controversies and
highly contentious political questions[,]” which has “transformed national
high courts into major political decision-making bodies.”50 In other words,
the “top down” delegation of responsibility to the judiciary, though often
attractive to legislators, also results in a delegation of power over important
political decisions and the interpretation of legislative intent.

48
49
50

See, e.g., Graber, supra note 38, at 61–70; LOVELL, supra note 38, at 41.
Id.
Hirschl, supra note 37, at 95.
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3. Delegation by Disputing Parties
Public interest and business advocates may appeal to legislative,
administrative or legal forums to resolve disputes with important social or
economic implications. When stakeholders choose to resolve disputes
through the courts, we may think of this as delegation of dispute resolution
authority from the “bottom up.”
Hirschl posits that members of social movements, business groups, and
public interest advocates are likely to choose legal over legislative forums
when courts are perceived as “more reputable, impartial, and effective
decision-making bodies than other institutions, which are viewed as
bureaucracy heavy or biased.”51 For example, Shapiro and Stone Sweet
observe this “bottom up” shift toward resolving disputes in third party
adjudication among international business interests.52 They note that the
World Trade Organization (WTO) established independent panels to help
resolve disputes between companies or countries regarding contractual
obligations under international trade agreements using a collaborative
approach.53 Yet, the participating countries, presumably at the request of
international businesses, enacted laws to formally enforce WTO
agreements, and have since moved to a more formal adjudication process.54
Similarly, Shapiro and Stone Sweet describe a shift in preferences among
individual international businesses toward using formal court-like
procedures, relying on precedence, and publishing decisions.55
Rachel Cichowski observes instances of “bottom up” delegation to a
formal authority among public interest advocates engaged in social

51

Id. at 96.
SHAPIRO & STONE SWEET, supra note 39.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
See id. at 75–78 (discussing the formalization of dispute resolution of international
trade agreements under the WTO).
52
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movements.56 Cichowski describes this as the “litigation dynamic,” which is
initiated “as a result of strategic action by individuals who are either
disadvantaged or advantaged by an available set of rules.”57 In this type of
situation, individuals invoke a rule or procedure through a formal claim or
court proceeding, which has broader implications for furthering their aims
for social change.58 Cichowski cites a number of examples in which
individual claimants have secured additional rights for the environment and
women’s rights in the workplace through formal adjudication.59 She
concludes that “in any system of governance with an independent judiciary
possessing judicial review powers, the judicial decision provides a potential
avenue for institutional change.”60
In general, these scholars and examples suggest that individual judicial
rulings can alter the underlying rules and norms that grant civil or other
rights. According to Cichowski, individual rulings can effect change both
directly, “by creating new legal rights for an individual or group that
enables subsequent claims,” and indirectly, “by changing the rules and
procedures in a way that impacts legislative action and creates a new set of
rules that may become the basis for subsequent legal action.”61
The discussion above suggests several reasons for disputing parties to
delegate dispute resolution authority to courts and administrative agencies.
Delegation results in increased opportunities for business interests, public
interest advocates, and everyday citizens to bring forth formal claims or
initiate litigation to ensure policies are implemented as intended.
Normatively, these opportunities may be considered be benefits of the
traditional system of administrative review and court proceedings. But the
56
57
58
59
60
61

See CICHOWSKI, supra note 40, at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 12.
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following discussion suggests that important policy goals may not be
achieved through this traditional system, prompting, in some cases, a shift
toward an alternative system.
4. Leaving Problems Unresolved and Policy Goals Unfulfilled
In order to exercise a right, gain a remedy, or effect change through a
legal ruling as described in the section above, an individual must first be
aware that such right of action is available to them. But legal scholar Susan
Silbey notes, “More often than not, as we go about our daily lives, we rarely
sense the presence of the law.”62 Further, an individual must have standing,
which usually means that he or she must have been negatively affected by
another party. In the case of employees who raise a concern about health,
safety, or environment within or outside the organization (i.e., a
whistleblower), they must prove they have been adversely affected in the
workplace as a result of their actions. This means the whistleblower must
prove the employer has taken an adverse action as a result of the employee
raising a concern that is specifically protected by statute. Finally, the
whistleblower must be capable of navigating the system of administrative
review or court proceedings, or of employing counsel to do so.
Scholars have noted that grievances or disputes rarely become formal
legal claims. Instead of pursuing administrative claims or litigation, studies
suggest that would-be claimants may just decide to forego pursuit of their
claims.63 This is particularly true of workers who may be reticent to bring a
claim against their employer or assume the role of victim.64 As the example
of the Hanford pipefitters suggests, the process of pursuing a claim through
62

Susan S. Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 323, 332
(2005).
63
See Richard Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the
Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 525 (1981).
64
See generally KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL
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administrative or legal processes may take years and exact a toll on a
worker’s financial and emotional resources.
As the pipefitters’ example suggests, for every worker who speaks out
about a health, safety, or environmental concern, there may be many more
who remain silent. Without workers or managers raising concerns outside
their chains of command or outside their organizations, serious safety issues
may go unaddressed. Silence ultimately defeats the purposes of
whistleblower protection laws, which, in the case of nuclear facilities, are
intended to prevent injury to workers or the public and avoid environmental
damage.
Because all parties at Hanford shared mutual goals for safe operations
and a focus on cleanup, they looked toward an alternative dispute resolution
system that could focus on those mutual interests, lower the potential risks
and costs to concerned workers and their employers, and retain control of
the dispute resolution process.
5. Shifting to an Alternative Approach
Disputes resolved through mediation focus on mutual gains and future
interactions, and this approach may result in more sustainable solutions and
outcomes than a traditional approach. For example, some evidence suggests
that disputes resolved through mediation can improve environmental
outcomes,65 resolve labor disputes,66 and encourage agreement on
commercial or industrial developments.67 As the discussion in this article
65

See, e.g., TOMAS M. KOONTZ ET AL., COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT: WHAT ROLES FOR GOVERNMENT? (2004); EDWARD WEBER, BRINGING
SOCIETY BACK IN GRASSROOTS ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES (2003); JULIA M. WONDOLLECK & STEVEN L. YAFFEE,
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MANAGEMENT (2000).
66
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See, e.g., LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & PATRICK FIELD, DEALING WITH AN ANGRY
PUBLIC: THE MUTUAL GAINS APPROACH TO RESOLVING DISPUTES (1996).
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proposes, approaches based on alternative dispute resolution principles offer
several possible benefits.

a) Focus on Mutual Goals in the Resolution Process
According to Deborah Hensler, alternative dispute resolution stemmed
from a 1960s populist movement that centered on the principle of returning
the power to resolve a dispute back to the disputants.68 The proponents of
this movement sought to substitute “mediative processes in which the
disputants would fashion a solution to their problem for adjudicative
processes that assign control of outcomes to a neutral third party.”69 The
consequences of such processes, proponents argued, would be that
disputants would “negotiate outcomes more appropriate to their situation,
more satisfactory, and more likely to contribute to the continuation of longterm relationships.”70
Consensual mechanisms also minimize the influence of an outside party’s
standards, values, and knowledge (or lack thereof) of the specific
circumstances or technical issues involved in the dispute.71 As Hensler
suggests above, the mediation mechanism can help parties identify mutual
interests and maximize the use of local knowledge that could contribute to a
solution agreeable to both parties.72

b) Reduce Risks and Costs
Other benefits of the alternative dispute resolution process are lower risks
and lower costs of resolution.73 Formal adjudicative processes usually
68
Deborah R. Hensler, Science in the Court: Is There a Role for Alternative Dispute
Resolution?, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 178 (1991).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 173–74.
72
See id. at 178.
73
E.g., Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1995).
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require legal assistance and are often protracted due to court capacity and
lengthy appeals processes.74 Some scholars caution that the high costs of
court participation and the potential for delays may create unfair barriers to
entry for citizens or public interest groups, discouraging those with
legitimate claims from bringing them forward.75 In the case of
whistleblowers, the availability of a lower cost and lower risk alternative
may encourage those who might otherwise stay silent to speak out.

c) Sustainable Outcomes
Agreements reached through alternative dispute resolution are less likely
to be appealed and more likely to be implemented than resolutions reached
through the traditional system.76 Alternative dispute resolution may also
increase trust and reciprocity in future interactions between disputing
parties. In that sense, alternative dispute resolution processes could
accelerate the circular process of normative change envisioned by Shapiro
and Stone Sweet (and do so through a consensual approach to dispute
resolution, rather than through precedent and rule change handed down by a
third party). As discussed below, the Hanford example shows that resolving
individual disputes in a consensual process may result in an agreement to
examine and change the policies that initially gave rise to the dispute.

III. OUTCOMES OF AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The discussion below evaluates the outcomes achieved through the
alternative dispute resolution approach at Hanford. It seeks to compare and
contrast the outcomes that might be reached through the traditional system
(i.e., formal claims and litigation) and the alternative, consensual approach

74

See MARC GALANTER, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 119–25 (1974).
75
See, e.g., EPP, supra note 40, at 25; GALANTER, supra note 74, at 119–25.
76
See generally Shavell, supra note 73.
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taken by the Hanford Council. This comparison proves challenging, as
public records are accessible for formal court proceedings, but not for
Council cases, which are protected under mediation proceedings as outlined
in the Revised Code of Washington.77 As such, the comparisons in this
article rely upon public records, reports published by the Hanford Council,
and media accounts.
A. Retaining Control over the Resolution
As described in the introduction, the pipefitters’ underlying concerns
about a Hanford manager’s disregard of safety specifications went
unresolved as they proceeded through the traditional process of depositions,
court hearings, and appeals. Because the adjudicatory process turns the
decision-making authority over to a DOL investigator or judge, the
resolution usually focuses on legal questions, such as wrongful dismissal
and appropriate remedies. The adjudicator gains control over the resolution,
and the resolution process generally discourages disputing parties from
talking directly to each other or to the investigator.78 The shift of control
fails to resolve the underlying problem that gave rise to the concerns.79 This
is particularly troubling if workers perceive that serious health, safety, or
environmental concerns may ultimately go unresolved even if they raise
these concerns.
One of the primary benefits of the Hanford Council process is its focus
on resolving the underlying health, safety, or environmental concern rather
than assigning blame. Such a focus meets the interests of all parties by
establishing a resolution mechanism for disputes that “represent[] an
77

WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.600 (2006).
See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., WHISTLEBLOWER
INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL 3-15 to -17 (2011) (discussing representation by legal
counsel).
79
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important public policy concern, namely that whistleblowers be able to
express their views and have issues addressed without retaliation.”80
B. Costs to Resolving Disputes
The eleven workers in the pipefitters’ case were ultimately awarded $6.2
million, including reimbursement for legal fees.81 The award represents an
average cost per employee of over $500 thousand, but does not include the
funds spent by the contractor on legal fees or the cost of the time spent by
management preparing for depositions and court hearings.82 Records
obtained through public disclosure show that a sampling of cases “resolved
through litigation or settlement in the late 1980s and early 1990s cost
taxpayers an average of $500,000 in contractor legal fees and $60,000 to
$600,000 in settlements or awards.”83
In contrast, the Hanford Council process has a record of much smaller
awards and expenses, aided in part by faster resolution times.84 As Council
Chair Jonathan Brock noted, “[t]he average cost of a Council case
resolution is about $33,000, about one-sixteenth of the direct legal costs of
the cases that gave rise to its creation, even if the other direct and indirect
costs and settlement costs are excluded.”85
For the contractors, the most significant cost savings may be in the
indirect costs of management time spent on litigation. Within the traditional
system, “[f]or the companies, the indirect costs in management time . . .
[were] measured in months, and the issues lingered for years.”86 Using the
80
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Hanford Council system, however, “cumulative management time can be
measured in days and the diversion from corporate obligations to site
operations is negligible. The reputation of supervisors and managers—and
public confidence in the company or the government—are no longer
affected by motions, depositions, news stories, or periodic legislative
inquires.”87
Whistleblowers benefit from the legal assistance and sense of legitimacy
that public interest groups provide.88 Savings in terms of time and legal fees
are also an important consideration for advocates, particularly if they are
able to advance their larger goals for improved safety through a less
expensive alternative mechanism.
C. Building Trust over Time
The development of trust over time, through repeat interactions and
successful case resolutions, has benefited disputing parties and fostered
long-term working relationships.89 Yet trust has not always been a constant
in the Hanford Council. With a change of contractors, the original Hanford
Council—the Hanford Joint Council—was dissolved in 2003, after having
resolved over fifty cases over the prior nine years.90 The new contractor did
not have a shared history of trust, nor had it experienced the conditions that
prompted its predecessor to originally sign the Hanford Council charter.91
But after only a year of relying on the traditional adjudicatory system to
resolve disputes, the CEO of the new contractor, with the support of the
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DOE, initiated a process to reinstate an alternative mechanism.92 In June
2005, the Hanford Concerns Council, modeled after the prior Hanford Joint
Council, opened its doors for business.93 Some individuals who served as
members of the Hanford Joint Council have become current members of the
Hanford Council, and the cycle of building trust and long-term working
relationships continues.94
The Hanford Council’s 2007 progress report describes this cycle,
Employees’ trust in the Council and its processes ultimately
extended to the company representatives and managers, furthering
DOE’s goals for the human performance initiative, which
encourages open examination of operations and feedback. The
increased trust, improved problem solving, and openness have
contributed to a safety conscious work environment and translated
directly to on-the-ground results.95
In fact, the outcomes of cases, and the processes for resolving them,
appears to have accelerated the rate of normative change in worker
protection practices. For example, in 2007, the government contractor and
nuclear safety advocates on the Hanford Council commissioned a jointsponsored study of the scientific underpinnings of the worker protection
practices at the Hanford tank farms.96 The parties signed a memorandum of
understanding, and after a nationwide search, the Council selected a small
panel of experts to conduct the review.97 The experts were tasked with
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determining whether worker protection practices were consistent with
industry best practices for setting exposure limits, and whether those limits
were sufficiently conservative to be protective of workers.98
As often happens in questions of environmental or public health
protections, the parties learned that scientific certainty, particularly in a
relatively unique and complex setting like Hanford, relies upon underlying
assumptions and contains many caveats; and, where the science ends, value
judgments begin.99 For example, the evidence prompted questions, such as,
what is an acceptable level of uncertainty about the potential for unintended
worker exposures?100 The Council has proven to be an ideal place for those
discussions to take place and to effect changes in worker protection
practices.101
D. Legitimacy Embedded in the Dispute Resolution Process
Working on broad policy questions (such as worker safety practices)
through a representative forum lends more legitimacy to outcomes than a
court decision in an individual dispute. An alternative forum lends
legitimacy in several ways. First, decisions emerging from a representative
forum may be more legitimate than those emerging from a more traditional
forum, such as a court or administrative agency, because they are decided
within a context that seeks to resolve the underlying concern, unlike
individual court cases or administrative claims, which are adjudicated based
98
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on the legal question at hand.
Second, decisions made within the scope of the Hanford Council’s task
must be reached through consensus and implemented per the charter
agreement. Although the Charter provides some exemptions for
“presumptive implementation” (such as if the consensus agreement violates
a DOE rule), and allows the whistleblower to reject the Council’s decision,
all cases resolved by the Council have been implemented to date. This
history suggests that decisions reached through a consensus process, such as
the Council’s, are less likely to be appealed. In contrast, the pipefitters’ case
wended through the appellate courts until a decision was finally handed
down from the Washington Supreme Court eleven years after the incident.
The pipefitter’s case resulted in multiple appeals while the Council process
has resulted in recommendations that are implemented per an ex-ante
agreement. The Council process and consensus agreements have a record of
successful implementation, and suggestions for improving worker
protection practices are usually incorporated.102 In sum, the consensus
process and ex-ante agreements, such as the charter and memoranda of
understanding, have led to the successful resolution of dozens of cases and
changes in worker protection practices.
E. Sustainability of the Process and Mutually Agreeable Decisions
Perhaps the most significant benefit of the Hanford Council’s alternative
dispute resolution process is that it draws upon and furthers the mutual
interests of all parties for the safe and efficient cleanup at Hanford. Because
the process prompts a problem-solving focus rather than blame-assigning
focus, the energies of all parties are directed at seeking mutual gains.
Cases that utilize the adjudicatory mechanism can take years or decades
102
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to resolve,103 but the contention and mistrust they engender lasts far longer.
Cases resolved using the Council mechanism allows for learning by
managers of private contractors, which almost always results in system
changes designed to correct underlying problems.
As the Hanford Council’s review of worker protection practices
demonstrates, long-term trust and relationships can lead to broader problem
solving. The Council’s 2007 progress report affirms this notion, asserting
that “[t]he interactions generated improved and productive problem-solving
capabilities that will outlast the case resolution process.”104 In short, the
kind of circular process for normative change envisioned by Shapiro and
Stone Sweet is sustained, or even accelerated, through this alternative
process.
The following table summarizes some of the potential outcomes of
traditional and alternative approaches to dispute resolution:
Table 2. Summary of Potential Outcomes Resulting from Traditional
Third Party Adjudication and Alternative Approaches
Potential Consequences of
Formal Third Party Adjudication
Control: resolution process is
subject to the standards, values,
expertise, and judgment of a third
party, and often encourages
polarized viewpoints rather than
mutual interests

Potential Consequences of
Consensual Resolution
Control: resolution process allows
for application of local knowledge,
identification of mutual interests of
the parties, and solutions appropriate
for the situation
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Costs: disputants face potentially
increased costs in terms of time and
legal fees, which some may argue
discourages bringing legitimate
disputes before a third party
adjudicator

Costs: disputants will pay
potentially
lower
costs
to
participate in consensual forums,
which some may argue encourages
disputants to bring disputes forward
that might otherwise be resolved
dyadically

Trust: because the third party
adjudication system encourages
polarized viewpoints, there is little
opportunity to build trust or
relationships that can help resolve
future disputes

Trust: because the disputants
work together with the help of a
third party, they often develop trust
and norms which contribute to longterm working relationships and an
ability to resolve future disputes

Legitimacy: since courts are often
considered to be anti-majoritarian,
as well as influential in important
public policy issues via decisions
rendered in individual cases,
outcomes of adjudicatory processes
can be criticized as illegitimate

Legitimacy: since participants in
the resolution process may include
more than just the disputing parties
themselves, the outcomes are often
seen as more legitimate, especially
if the resolution has broader policy
implications

Sustainability:
because
the
disputing parties leave the final
decision to a third party, they may
be more likely to appeal a decision
unfavorable to them or to refuse to
implement the decision

Sustainability:
because
the
disputing parties work together to
develop solutions, the outcomes are
more likely to be implemented
without appeal or resistance
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V. PRINCIPLES THAT MAY BE APPLIED IN ESTABLISHING
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES IN OTHER SETTINGS
This article has explored conditions which may prompt a shift away from
a traditional system of adjudication to an alternative mechanism for dispute
resolution, as well as the potential consequences of such a shift. The
Hanford Council example suggests that an alternative approach offers a
number of beneficial outcomes that are often difficult to quantify, but that
may accomplish a greater fulfillment of policy goals to protect workers and
prevent accidents. The lessons learned from this example may help
policymakers and stakeholders recognize when an alternative approach
might work in addressing situations that involve repeat players in an
ongoing dispute or struggle to effect change. These kinds of situations
might include cleanup efforts at other toxic waste sites, production or
transport of oil, or public safety issues, such as transportation or emergency
preparedness.
Rather than prescribing specific arrangements that may apply in these
situations, this article outlines principles that could provide a foundation for
constructing an alternative approach. These principles are derived both from
lessons learned at the Hanford site, as well as the literature on dispute
resolution.
A. Focus on Mutual Gains
The Hanford example and the alternative dispute resolution literature
suggest that an alternative mechanism should recognize the parties’ interests
in terms of their goals.105 If these interests are not being met using the
traditional system of administrative claims or court proceedings, or if they
105
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could be better met by an alternative system, then conditions are ripe for the
formation of a consensual mechanism.
A focus on mutual interests is also supported by the notion of the
“rational actor,” which suggests that individuals will seek to maximize their
own interests. Institutional scholars have built upon the concept of a rational
actor, and those embracing the “rational institutionalist” model posit that the
relevant actors within an organization “have a fixed set of preferences or
tastes, behave entirely instrumentally so as to maximize the attainment of
these preferences, and do so in a highly strategic manner that presumes
extensive calculation.”106 In other words, the rational institutionalist model,
which expands from the individual to institution, suggests that organizations
will originate and sustain based on “the value those functions have for the
actors affected by the institution.”107 In sum, this view suggests that
organizations are most likely to shift toward an alternative mechanism if
key actors believe it is most likely to facilitate the achievement of
organizational goals.
A new mechanism should also be responsive to the conditions and
concerns that gave rise to it. A history of past interactions shaped the
perceptions and preferences of each actor in the Hanford example, and led
to the embrace of an alternative mechanism. Since every situation involving
ongoing conflict and historical contention will be different, consideration of
the unique histories and perceptions of disputants will be important when
establishing a charter or an ex-ante agreement. The Hanford Council has
been successful in large part because advocates agreed to refer cases to the
alternative mechanism and contractors agreed ex-ante to implement
recommendations.
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B. Foster Reciprocity
Reciprocity can be fostered by “enlarging the shadow of the future” or
“increasing the possibility and importance of future interactions.”108 This
conception suggests that if disputing parties see the resolution of an
individual dispute not as a single transaction, but as part of a series of repeat
interactions, they will place greater emphasis on resolving disputes in a way
that preserves their ability to resolve future disputes. In a formal
adjudicatory setting, the shadow of the future is short, as the parties are
likely to meet only in the courtroom. In the case of whistleblowers, this
meeting often comes after working relationships have been severed and the
parties have no expectation of working together in the future. An
adjudicatory forum prompts the presentation of polarized views and a focus
on narrow legal questions, with little focus on problem solving or future
interactions.
One way to lengthen the “shadow of the future” is to concentrate
interactions “so that relationships are built among small groups within the
organization.”109 This concentration of interactions holds true of the model
designed at Hanford, where delegates from the contractor and advocacy
community serve three-year appointed terms on the Council, creating the
opportunity and expectation of repeated interactions. By establishing an
alternative forum that ensures ongoing interactions, such as individual
dispute resolutions, parties are encouraged to understand the perspectives
that contractors, advocates, and neutral members bring to the table. In fact,
the Hanford Council experience suggests that these differing worldviews
can contribute to a greater understanding between disputing parties and to a
greater capacity for resolving disputes.110 The ex-ante agreement and
108

ROBERT AXLEROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 129 (Basic Books 2d ed.
2006).
109
Id.
110
See, e.g., A Membership that Ensures Neutrality, supra note 32.

VOLUME 11 • ISSUE 2 • 2013

647

648 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

consensus requirement prompt not only understanding, but efforts to find
mutually beneficial resolutions. In this way, trust and working relationships
established through the Council process have led to ongoing reciprocity as
described above, lengthening the shadow of the future.
C. Assure Predictability
Ex-ante agreements, charters, or rules of engagement that ensure
predictable interactions are an important principle for an effective
consensual mechanism. Written agreements can help ensure sustainability
over time through predictable provisions for reaching resolution and
implementing consensual decisions, and future adaptations. According to
Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, such agreements can sustain institutions
“by helping to identify the present and future behavior of other actors based
on their preferences.”111 Hall and Taylor emphasize that “the institution
enforces agreements and penalizes defections. In sum, institutions inform
the individuals’ strategic decisions by providing some certainties about the
strategies that other actors might employ.”112
By following the principle of encouraging cooperative behavior through
agreements, charters, procedures, or rules of engagement, parties can
predict when and under what circumstances their interests might be met in a
consensual process. At Hanford, assurances (such as criteria for accepting a
case), consensus on resolutions, and “presumptive implementation” of
Council resolutions are embodied in the Council charter,113 offering a
degree of predictability for how others will participate in the resolution
process. As a result, the Hanford Council mechanism (with the exception of
a brief interruption due to a change of contractors) has sustained for nearly
fifteen years, resolved over sixty cases, and improved safety for workers at
111
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the nuclear site.114
D. Ensure Legitimacy
Those skeptical of mediation might argue that closed-door negotiations
lack legitimacy. They might be concerned that agreements are not publicly
available. Settlements achieved in this way do not set precedent for future
cases, and will not contribute to rule change that ultimately affects future
resolutions and broader governance. Therefore, it is important to consider
the perceived legitimacy of a resolution process that affects broader public
policy issues, such as worker safety and whistleblower protections.
On the other hand, resolution through the traditional system of
administrative filings and court proceedings can also be criticized as lacking
legitimacy. For example, critics might suggest that rulings that affect future
interactions and broader governance are best achieved through the
legislative branch rather than through the courts.115 In other words, critics
might suggest that court adjudication represents de facto policy making
through an anti-majoritarian mechanism.116
The Hanford Council addressed potential concerns about legitimacy by
including repeat players in the resolution process of individual disputes in
situations where there was ongoing conflict. Those most likely to be
concerned with the legitimacy of an outcome are included. Further,
resolutions that emerge from an alternative process are not construed as
“creating law.”
Concerns about legitimacy should be addressed during the formation of
an alternative mechanism. If concerns about legitimacy are not addressed,
disputing parties may not be willing to use the system or accept its
resolutions. Parties outside the process must also view the system as
114
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legitimate. If a forum for resolution does not have legitimacy, either through
statutory grants of authority (in the case of administrative adjudication or
court proceedings) or agreement among stakeholders (in the case of a
consensual mechanism such as the Hanford Council), then those outside the
process may not accept a resolution or its influence on future interactions.
One way to help assure perceptions of legitimacy is to ensure that all
perspectives are represented in an established consensual mechanism. This
principle has thus far defrayed any criticism of illegitimacy at the Hanford
site, particularly in outcomes that affect broader policies for worker
protection.

VI. CONCLUSION
This article has examined traditional and alternative systems for resolving
disputes, their theoretical underpinnings, and their potential outcomes.
Building upon the example of whistleblower concerns at the Hanford
Nuclear Site, this article has shown that an alternative form for resolving
workplace concerns and disputes has effectively furthered the policy goal of
protecting workers who raise concerns. Although this example has focused
on a specific site and type of dispute, the lessons learned from the Hanford
Council may be broadly applicable.
The Hanford Council illustrates that an alternative approach based upon a
consensual process can achieve the same ends as third party adjudication
while at the same time allowing for a focus on problem-solving and future
interactions. For example, the Hanford Council has provided an alternate
venue for raising concerns while meeting the interests and mutual goals of
the parties. For elected officials and agency leaders, the Council offers
political cover by keeping highly polarized cases from leading to
congressional hearings and media broadcast. Public interest advocates have
benefitted from a lower cost forum that offers an opportunity to effect
change in policies and practices that affect worker safety at the site.
Additionally, the Hanford Council has met the needs of parties concerned

WHISTLEBLOWING

To Mediate or Adjudicate?

about predictable processes by using ex-ante agreements. It has prompted
accelerated normative change by focusing on problem solving and larger
policy implications. By participating in the consensus process,
representatives from both the contractor and the advocacy communities
have lent legitimacy to Council resolutions.
Perhaps most importantly, the Hanford Council has lowered the cost and
risk threshold for workers who wish to raise a concern. Workers at the site
are not faced with a choice of remaining silent or engaging in a decade-long
court battle if their concerns are not well received. The availability of this
alternative helps to make real the rights granted to workers in ERA’s
whistleblower provisions and helps to ensure that serious concerns can be
heard and resolved by company leadership. In this latter respect, an
alternative approach helps to further the goal of accident prevention that is
implicit in whistleblower protection laws.
This article has provided a framework for recognizing when an
alternative approach might be used to resolve ongoing disputes at other
sites. This could include other commercial and defense nuclear facilities, or
sites that produce and ship oil, manufacture chemicals, or mines. This
article proposes a set of principles upon which alternative mechanisms
might be established—mechanisms that allow for concerns to be raised and
dissenting voices to be heard in decision processes that govern hazardous
sites or activities. The principles upon which an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism might be built—a focus on mutual interests and a
commitment to fostering reciprocity, creating predictability, and ensuring
legitimacy—may not only bring about resolution of existing disputes, but
may also shape the course of future interactions and dispute resolutions.
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